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Purpose- The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the mandatory adoption of 
eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) on firm’s stock liquidity. 
Design/methodology/approach– Using a random effects model, this study examines the 
impact of the mandatory adoption of XBRL on firm’s stock liquidity of 980 companies 
pertaining to 13 countries for a period from 2000 to 2016.  
Findings– We find that the mandatory adoption of XBRL enhances firm’s stock liquidity. In 
addition, we find that the impact of the mandatory adoption of XBRL on firm’s stock liquidity 
is more pronounced in civil law countries than in common law countries. 
Originality/value– This paper contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of 
XBRL especially for the civil law countries by examining the impact of the mandatory adoption 
of XBRL on firm’s stock liquidity. 
Keywords: XBRL, cross-country analysis, liquidity, civil law, common law. 
Paper type- Research paper 
Introduction 
Financial reporting is crucial to ensuring the long-term success of a business or 
institution (Perri and Allko, 2015). A high quality accounting information is essential and 
strategically vital to the development of listed companies and the development of investment 
in the capital market (Zeghal and Mhedhbi, 2006). The companies publish their financial 
information on the Web since the mid-1990s (Debreceny and Gray, 2001). The different digital 
formats vary from Microsoft Word, Excel, PDF, TXT, HTML or in special formats produced 
by different software (Gostimir, 2015). 
However, to date, there has been a problem with the effectiveness of communicating 
accurate and unambiguous financial information over the Internet (Faboyede et al., 2016). The 
content of corporate information on the web is not very different from the financial information 
provided on paper-based documents (Yoon, Zo and Ciganek, 2011). 
Moreover, with the incredible amount of information in the annual reports, it is difficult 
for users to analyse all information (Kaya, 2014). When it is difficult to produce, interpret, 
compare and analyse financial information, negative consequences can be observed, such as: 
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the investor may abandon the investment, the banks may not give loans, an auditor may not 
view financial statements as credible (Grosu et al., 2010). According to Debreceny and Gray 
(2001), stakeholders are not fully satisfied with Web-based data and there is still a high demand 
for information from traditional third-party information intermediaries. Companies that seemed 
perfectly healthy from a financial point of view suddenly had to announce they had solvency 
problems and collapsed in a few months or weeks (Espinosa, Tapia and Trombetta, 2005). 
The recent corporate bankruptcies and the rapid change of business world have 
highlighted the need for transparency and call for a change in the way of dissemination of 
financial information. The loss of accuracy is an increasingly apparent risk. Regulators seek to 
improve the quality of financial reporting (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2003; Zehri and 
Chouaibi, 2013). In addition, with the old presentation format of financial information, it is 
costly to retrieve, manipulate and use that information. Companies spend billions of dollars to 
present and transfer data (Kloeden, 2006). Companies around the world are seeking to increase 
the transparency of their financial reports while reducing the regulatory burden (Sudalaimuthu 
and Haraiharan, 2011). To meet the needs of shareholders in terms of speed and transparency, 
companies must implement more effective means of communication 
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2003). 
Stakeholders require transparent, easily accessible and timely information. These 
stakeholders often choose the Internet as the preferred means of communication and want as 
much information as possible to be placed on the firm’s Web site (Burnett, Friedman and 
Murthy, 2006).  
The introduction of XBRL for financial reporting has been a major change in recent 
years (Li, Lin and Ni, 2012). The acronym XBRL stands for eXtensible Business Reporting 
Language. XBRL is a language for electronic communication of business and financial data, 
which is revolutionizing corporate reporting around the world. It provides major benefits in the 
preparation, analysis and reporting of corporate information. It offers cost savings, greater 
efficiency, and increased accuracy and reliability for everyone involved in the provision or use 
of financial data. The data will be cheaper, better and faster (Apostolou and Nanopoulos, 2009; 
Kloeden, 2006; PriceWaterHouseCoopeers, 2003). XBRL can be considered as a bar code for 
financial statements (Manmohan and Pk, 2014). It is a programming language independent of 
any software or platform, facilitates the preparation and exchange of business information 
(Dhingra, Singh and Magu, 2014; Lim and Perrin, 2014).  
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Regulators and government agencies in many countries are now using XBRL for 
regulatory submissions. XBRL has become the global standard for financial reporting. It is 
implemented in more than 60 countries around the world (Taylor and Dzuranin, 2010; Bai, 
Sakaue and Takeda, 2014; Cormier et al., 2019).  
However, although XBRL has several advantages, several problems can limit its 
adoption (Ball, 2006; Brands, 2013; Boritz and No, 2008; Debreceny et al., 2010; Dhole et al., 
2015; Roohani and Zheng, 2013). For example, XBRL allows firms to create their own 
taxonomy extensions. The use of extensions can be a challenge and may decrease the 
comparability between companies, thus eliminating one of the primary goals of XBRL (Boritz 
and No, 2008). Dhole et al. (2015) find that financial statement comparability of US firms 
declined after the XBRL mandate. In addition, the adoption and implementation of XBRL must 
be carefully managed and monitored. Robust and rigorous internal controls governing the 
application of XBRL need to be designed, implemented and maintained. XBRL requires 
considerations from those who prepare and maintain XBRL reports, such as, the completeness 
and accuracy of tagging, the application of appropriate taxonomies, the need for and nature of 
extensions, and the relationships between reported elements (Ball, 2006).   
Several studies including Felo, Kim and Lim (2018), Li, Ni and lin (2012), Hao, Zhang 
and Fang (2014), Luo et al. (2017) find that the adoption of XBRL improves the accuracy of 
analysts' forecasts, improves firms’ stock liquidity and reduces the cost of equity capital. In 
contrast, Blankespoor, Miller and White (2014), Liu, Yao, et al. (2014), Liu,  Luo, et al. (2014) 
find contradictory results. Other research also shows that there is a lack of knowledge of XBRL 
in multiple countries and by multiple users (Steenkamp and Nel, 2012; Perri and Allko, 2015). 
Therefore, the economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of XBRL are not obvious. 
According to Shan, Troshani and Richardson (2015), there has been little research on the effects 
of XBRL. In this context, we propose in our study to determine the impact of the mandatory 
adoption of XBRL on firms’ stock liquidity. Blankespoor, Miller and White (2014) and Liu, 
Luo, et al. (2014) find that XBRL increases information asymmetry and reduces the firm’s 
stock liquidity. Yoon, Zo and Ciganek (2011), Li, Ni and lin (2012), Tzu-Yi et al. (2016) and 
Liu, Luo and Wang (2017) find that the information asymmetry is reduced after the adoption 
of XBRL and the firm stock’s liquidity is improved. The explanation of their different findings 




Previous studies indicate also that the differences in firms’ stock liquidity derive from 
the legal protection and the nature of the information environment. The civil law system 
generates less investor protection and shareholder rights than the common law system, which 
leads to higher investor demand for activities that reduce information uncertainty and company 
risk (Abdolmohammadi et al., 2017). Therefore, we will also determine the effect of the legal 
system on the relationship between the mandatory adoption of XBRL and firms’ stock liquidity. 
In our study, we conducted an empirical analysis using a sample of 980 firms from 13 
countries for a period from 2000 to 2016. We find that the mandatory use of XBRL positively 
impacts the firm’s stock liquidity measured by the Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio. We also 
find that the legal system moderates the association between the mandatory adoption of XBRL 
and firm’s stock liquidity. The mandatory adoption of XBRL positively impacts the firm’s stock 
liquidity both in civil law countries and in common law countries. However, the impact of the 
mandatory adoption of XBRL is more pronounced in civil law countries. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first cross-country study that investigates the 
impact of mandatory adoption of XBRL on firm’s stock liquidity. We use a number of firms 
from different countries and from different legal system. The majority of research that has 
examined the relationship between XBRL and liquidity is focused on one country. In addition, 
studies have focused on developed countries especially the case of United-States. In our study, 
we use different countries, developed and developing countries, with a long period of time. Our 
study enriches the investigation of the consequences of the use of XBRL. We confirm the 
positive consequences of XBRL in general and especially for civil law countries. 
Understanding the economic consequences of XBRL is an important issue for 
companies, regulators, investors and XBRL International organization. Companies that need to 
know if the benefits of XBRL outweigh the costs of its adoption. Our study can help companies 
to better understand the factors that may affect stock liquidity. The results of our study provide 
insights on the positive benefits of XBRL. Companies have to provide investors with better 
presentation of information in order to reduce information asymmetry and thus improve stock 
market liquidity. Countries that mandate the adoption of XBRL seem to be more attractive to 
investors. The findings confirm previous works that suggest that the mandatory adoption of 
XBRL benefits investors and especially small investors. For example, our study confirms the 
results of Blankespoor (2019) that finds that firms in United-States increase their quantitative 
footnote disclosures upon implementation of XBRL detailed tagging requirements. According 
6 
 
the Blankespoor (2019), for firm to receive the benefits of disclosure, market participants must 
process the information disclosed. Thus, when processing costs prevent participants from fully 
responding to disclosure, the extent of disclosure benefits could be muted and firm disclosure 
choices affected. XBRL helps to reduce processing costs for users. For example, XBRL enables 
market participants to do additional processing of the information by allowing them to receive 
more information at a lower cost, with saved time and resources and by allowing more detailed 
comparisons (Blankespoor, 2019). Hence, we posit that the adoption of XBRL helps to reduce 
the cost of external finance and contributes to the development of the stock market.  
For regulators, the results demonstate that the adoption of XBRL helps to improve the 
value relevance of disclosure. Therefore, regulators that do not yet mandate the use of XBRL 
in their jurisdictions should think about making XBRL mandatory. Given the benefits of XBRL, 
investor will be motivated to request the adoption of this mean of disclosure especially in civil 
law countries. 
Furthermore, our study increases the awareness about XBRL. It helps XBRL 
International organization that oversees the development of XBRL and encourages its adoption 
in its mission by improving the level of knowledge about this language and about its benefits.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the background and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 provides the research methodology. Section 4 reports the 
empirical analysis and results and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Background and hypotheses development 
2.1. Background 
Information asymmetry occurs when some economic agents have more information than 
the others. Information asymmetry takes the form of adverse selection and/or moral hazard 
(Akerlof, 1970; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bahmani, 2014; Rodrigues and Galdi, 2017). It 
has different adverse outcomes, such as transaction costs, low liquidity market and increasing 
cost of capital. Management is encouraged to reduce this asymmetry and disclose more 
voluntary information (Bahmani, 2014; Inchausti, 1997). According to Ragothaman (2012), 
one way to mitigate the information asymmetry problem is to improve disclosures through the 
adoption of XBRL. When a firm provides financial reports in a high-quality, in a standard 
format (XBRL), it is likely to be regarded as less risky by investors. This favorable perception 
could decrease the cost of capital for the firm and its stock price could go up.    
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Presenting financial reporting via XBRL is a good decision in terms of transparency, 
timeliness and relevance of financial reporting information. Regulators have made XBRL 
financial reporting mandatory, so that they can monitor business performance and thereby 
reduce fraud (Manmohan and Pk, 2014).    
XBRL provides a format that facilitates access and reuse of information. Its adoption 
makes it easier to analyze, compare and reuse of information. As a result, overall transparency 
will be improved (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2003). A more reliable financial reporting system 
can improve the corporate transparency, which can help the market to better oversee the firm, 
and attract foreign investors (Wang, Wen and Seng, 2014). The adoption of XBRL facilitates 
communication between market participants and improves the quality of decisions of 
stakeholder and if a company provides financial reports in a high quality, standard format, 
investors are likely to evaluate the company as less risky (Talebnia, 2016). According to Hao, 
Zhang and Fang (2014), there are at least three reasons to explain the effect of XBRL on the 
reduction of the cost equity capital. First, XBRL may reduce capital cost through “improved 
information transparency”.  XBRL has the potential to improve comparability and consistency 
of information, enhances accessibility and usability to financial and nonfinancial information, 
and increase financial disclosure. Second, XBRL may “reduce transaction cost”. Implementing 
XBRL may incur additional costs at the beginning of such adoption. In the long run, however, 
XBRL will lower the cost of producing information. Third, adopting XBRL may “increase 
liquidity” and “decrease firm risk”. 
XBRL helps stakeholders to easily and quickly access the information that is available. 
Thereby, allowing them to focus more on analyses of the data rather than on data compilation 
or gathering. It can help investors with limited resources (Peng, Shon and Tan, 2011; Wallace, 
2001). 
XBRL has several advantages for financial analysts. For example, according to Liu, 
Wang and Yao (2014), XBRL allows analysts to save more time for more analysis in order to 
increase forecast accuracy by reducing manual tasks or waiting time for additional data from 
data intermediaries (e.g., information consolidators). Many studies find that the adoption of 
XBRL has a positive impact on both analyst following and forecast accuracy (Li, Lin and Ni, 
2012; Zhang, Riordan and Weinhardt, 2013; Liu, Wang and Yao, 2014; Felo, Kim and Lim, 
2018). For example, Zhang, Riordan and Weinhardt (2013) find that the number of analysts 
following a firm's stock increased after the voluntary introduction of XBRL using a sample of 
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92 US companies during the period 2005 and 2009. The number of analysts who follow a 
company is important because it represents the asymmetry of information between investors 
and companies (Zhang, Riordan and Weinhardt, 2013). Financial analysts provide a means of 
ensuring that all of the company's information is presented to stock market participants (Farooq 
and Satt, 2014). Consequently, financial analysts help to reducing information asymmetries 
(Lakhal, 2007; Farooq and Satt, 2014; Yao and Liang, 2019). They can resolve inefficiencies 
in governance mechanisms by providing new information to stock market participants (Farooq 
and Satt, 2014).  
XBRL benefits also to auditors. XBRL enables continuous auditing. It allows auditors 
to generate reports in much shorter time than the traditional model. Short timelines during the 
audit can trigger corrective actions in a much more useful way than traditional audits (Reyes, 
Rodríguez and Dolado, 2007). Audit is a way to reduce information asymmetry and agency 
costs (Almutairi, Dunn and Skantz, 2009). 
Several authors show that the economic consequences of information disclosure vary 
depending on the country’s legal regime and the level of investor protection (Brockman and 
Chung, 2003; Wang, Liao and Deng, 2003; Chhabra, Ferris and Sen, 2009; Farooq and Derrabi, 
2012, 2013; Chebaane and Ben Othman, 2014; Shi et al., 2015; Tang and Chang, 2015; Chen, 
Lobo and Chen, 2016; Persakis and Iatridis, 2017). In general, the legal systems come from two 
main traditions: common law which is of English origin and civil law which comes from Roman 
law and which is subdivided into three main families, namely French civil law, Germanic civil 
law and Scandinavian civil law. The civil legal tradition is the oldest, the most influential and 
the most frequently applied in the world (La Porta et al. 1997; La Porta et al., 2000; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-silanes, and Shleifer, 2008).  
Some prior research finds also that the extent of benefits of XBRL depend to the 
country’s legal system (Shan, Troshani and Richardson, 2015; Abdolmohammadi et al., 2017). 
For example, Shan, Troshani and Richardson (2015) find that the effect of the mandatory use 
of XBRL on agency costs is greater in the United States (a common law country) than in Japan 
(a non-common law country).  
2.2. Hypotheses development 
Voluntary disclosure of information is a way to mitigate information asymmetry and 
agency conflicts and deters managers from opportunistic behavior (Loukil and Yousfi, 2012). 
According to Guidara, Khlif and Jarboui (2014), the timeliness and the extent of voluntary 
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disclosure represent two essential mechanisms of corporate transparency. Reliable and 
transparent corporate disclosure will lead to greater investor confidence (Tamara and Hutagaol, 
2013). Greater and high quality information disclosure improves information transparency and 
reduces investors’ uncertainty and risk with regard to the future performance of a company 
which in turn increases demand for a firm’s securities and enhance market liquidity (Hao, 
Zhang and Fang, 2014). In contrast, when there is a risk of information due to a lacks of 
transparency in financial information, investors seek to protect themselves against the expected 
risks, which result a higher cost of capital for the firm (Chen et al., 2015).   
According to Abdullah and Ismail (2008), voluntary disclosure is becoming more 
important to the business community in making decisions in line with the increasing 
sophistication of business operations. Disclosure of information to market can provide 
companies with advantages over their competitors (Jullobol and Sartmool, 2013). It can reduce 
information asymmetry, improve stock liquidity and reduce the firm’s cost of capital (Welker, 
1995; Botosan, 1997; Poshakwale and Courtis, 2005; Petersen and Plenborg, 2006; Lakhal, 
2008; Haddad, AlShattarat and Nobanee, 2009; Kuo and Lin, 2014; Guidara, Khlif and Jarboui, 
2014; Akrout and Ben Othman, 2015). For example, Petersen and Plenborg (2006) find a 
negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and different proxies for information 
asymmetry in the case of Denmark. According to Petersen and Plenborg (2006), if firms focus 
on improving the level of disclosure, they get the attention of investors. As a result they may 
experience lower cost of capital and more efficient prices on shares. Haddad, AlShattarat and 
Nobanee (2009) find the same result using a sample of Jordanian non-financial companies. Kuo 
and Lin (2014) find a positive association between disclosure levels and stock market liquidity 
in Taiwan.  
In addition, with the development of the Web as a means of information disclosure, 
several empirical studies have examined the utility and the effect of the information disclosed 
of the website (Al-Htaybat, 2011; Abdi et al., 2018; Abdi and Omri, 2020; Al-Sartawi and 
Reyad, 2019; Gajewski and Li, 2015; Ben Saada et al., 2010). For example, Gajewski and Li 
(2015) and Ben Saada et al. (2010) find that Internet disclosure reduces the level of information 
asymmetry and improves the stock market liquidity in France. According to Abdi and Omri 
(2020) and Abdi, Kacem and Omri (2018), the use of the Web to disseminate information allows 
providing immediate, up-to-date and relevant information to users and consequently, it allows 
a more transparent disclosure and leads to improve firm’s transparency. Internet disclosure 
allows a diffusion of information worldwide and facilitates the availability of information. 
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The use of XBRL is more advantageous than the traditional web format. XBRL does 
not intend to modify any of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) but to 
present them (Reyes, Rodríguez and Dolado, 2007). The financial reporting under XBRL 
format is not intended to provide new information other than that reported in the traditional 
format (Peng, Shon and Tan, 2011).   
The adoption of XBRL ensures the quality of the information disclosed and allows users 
to trust the data communicated. The higher is the quality of information, the stronger is the 
corporate governance and the less important is the information asymmetry. Managers will have 
less incentive to hide information. As a consequence, companies with stronger governance, less 
information asymmetry should have high stock liquidity (Peng, Shon and Tan, 2011; Yoon, Zo 
and Ciganek, 2011; Liu, Luo and Wang, 2017; Birt, Muthusamy and Bir, 2017). In Korea, 
Yoon, Zo and Ciganek (2011) compare the period before and after the mandatory adoption of 
XBRL, from December 2006 to August 2007 and from December 2007 to August 2008 to 
investigate the association between the adoption of XBRL and the information asymmetry. 
Yoon, Zo and Ciganek (2011) find that XBRL reduces information asymmetry in the capital 
market. In Belgium, Liu, Luo and Wang, (2017) find that the adoption of XBRL is associated 
with a significant increase in liquidity and decrease in information asymmetry during the period 
2005-2010. In United-States, Li, Lin and Ni (2012) find the same result.  
Furthermore, the use of XBRL shows that the country is up to date, modern and uses 
the latest technology than the old methods. XBRL enables to improve the firm´s reputation in 
the capital markets (Bonsón, Cortijo et Escobar, 2009). According to Ra and Lee (2018), if the 
investors view XBRL adoption as good news, then they are willing to pay a higher price for 
shares of firms under the XBRL system. Therefore, we hypothesise:   
H1: The mandatory adoption of XBRL has a positive impact on firm’s stock liquidity 
Companies in countries with strong investor protection have more disclosure and a high 
level of transparency (Ben Othman and Zeghal, 2008; Ben Othman and Zeghal, 2010; 
Gruszczyński, 2010; Chebaane and Ben Othman, 2014). According to Huang et al. (2014), 
outside investors are only willing to trade stocks if they know that the returns on their 
investments are well protected by laws and will return to them than being entrenched by 




The key mechanism of protecting outside investors, whether they are shareholders or 
creditors, is the legal system, including both laws and their enforcement. When investor rights 
such as the voting rights of the shareholders and the reorganization and liquidation rights of the 
creditors are extensive and well enforced by regulators or courts, investors are willing to finance 
firms. In contrast, when the legal system does not protect outside investors, corporate 
governance and external finance do not work well (La Porta et al., 2000). Better legal protection 
assures investors that in addition to their original investment, more of the firm's profits will 
come back to them in the form of dividends and interest, and this assurance motivates them to 
pay more for the financial assets offered by the entrepreneur (Anderson and Gupta, 2009).  
According to Brockman and Chung (2003), the legal / regulatory environment largely 
determines the quantity and reliability of publicly available information, particularly at the firm 
level. Insufficient regulations and institutions facilitate the presence of informed investors 
(Hanousek and Podpiera, 2003). According to Haidar (2009), when laws fail to stop self-
dealing, the concentration of ownership becomes greater. La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al. 
(1997) investigate the link between the legal environment and the capital markets using a 
sample of 49 countries. They find that the legal environment, measured by both the legal rules 
and the quality of law enforcement, has an important effect on the ability of companies in 
different countries to obtain more external funding. They find that common law countries have 
the best protection for investors and benefit from better access to external financing than civil 
law countries, and in particular French civil law countries.  
The legal environment has a strong influence on the business activities of a country, as 
investors will tend to look for places where contracts are enforced. Poor compliance with 
contracts can have an influence on investor's willingness to commit their wealth to fund projects 
(Gomez, 2016). In common law countries, managers have less flexibility to exercise their 
discretion over published results (Kobeissi, 2005). Investments tend to be low in countries with 
high risk of expropriation and low property rights (Gomez, 2016). 
Therefore, the benefits of the introduction of XBRL will help more civil law countries 
than common law countries.  XBRL enables companies to improve their investor relations by 
providing more transparent and user-friendly information (Financial Reporting Council, 2009). 
XBRL makes information more easily accessible. It serves as a signal for better corporate 
governance and innovation. It helps also to mitigate the increased risk of information when 
there is high complexity in the information environment (Zhang, Riordan and Weinhardt, 2013; 
Kim, Lim and No, 2012). 
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Therefore, we believe that the impact of the mandatory adoption of XBRL on stock 
liquidity in civil law countries is more pronounced than in common law countries. Based on 
these arguments, we hypothesise that: 
H2: The effect of the mandatory XBRL adoption on firm’s stock liquidity is higher in 
civil law countries than in common law countries 
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Sample selection and data 
 We use companies in countries requiring the adoption of XBRL. We use all countries 
that have mandated the adoption of XBRL for its listed firms and which the data is available 
(please refer to Table 1). We eliminate financial firms from the sample because they face 
specific regulations in comparison to other companies (Ibrahim and Samad, 2011; Tang and 
Chang, 2015).  
The countries that have mandated XBRL and included in our analysis are the following: 
India, United-States, Singapore, Israel, China, Chile, South Korea, Japan, Spain, Belgium, 
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Denmark. Taiwan has adopted XBRL in 2010, 
however, we dropped it due to the unavailability of data at country-level. Our final sample 
consists of 980 companies from 13 countries. We randomly choose our sample. Our sample 
represents 34 industries.  
Our study covers a period of 17 years, from 2000 to 2016. We start in 2000 to ensure 
that the period preceding the mandatory adoption of XBRL is sufficiently long. The first 
country that mandated the adoption of XBRL is China in 2004. Our sample consists of 16,592 
observations.  
The data relating to our dependent and control variables are collected from Datastream, 
Worldscope, WorldBank and Thomson One. We collected the data about the legal system from 
factbook. For the independant variable, the mandatory adoption of XBRL is collected from 
different sources like the website of XBRL International (https://www.xbrl.org/), research 
papers (such as Yoon, Zo and Ciganek, 2011; Peng, Shon and Tan, 2011; Liu, Luo and Wang, 
2017; Bai, Sakaue and Takeda, 2014) and reports published by members of the XBRL 
International organization (such as O‘Kelly, 2010; Rønmos, 2015). We also used the website of 






  Insert Table 1 here 
3.2. Model development 
𝑳𝑰𝑸𝑼𝑰𝑫𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕  
= 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑨𝑫𝑶𝑷𝑿𝑩𝑹𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑼𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑹𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑩𝑬𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑫𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑰𝑵𝑭𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑪𝑻 + 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑼𝑺𝑻𝑹𝒀 𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑪𝑻
+ 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻𝑹𝒀 𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑪𝑻 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Dependant variable 
In our study, we measure our dependant variable, LIQUIDITY, by the Amihud’s 
illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) (see Table 2 for variables definition). 
Several studies use the Amihud's illiquidity measure (ILLIQ) (e.g. Espinosa, Tapia and 
Trombetta, 2005; Tang and Wang, 2011; Ascioglu et al., 2012; Al-Jaifi, 2017; Al-Jaifi, Al-









The illiquidity ratio is the daily ratio of absolute stock returns to trading volume (in 
dollars), averaged over a certain period (Amihud, 2002). 
With:  𝐷𝑖𝑦 is the number of days for stock i in year y,  𝑅𝑖𝑦𝑑  is the return on stock i in day d in 
year y, and 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑦𝑑 is the respective daily trading volume in dollars. It can be interpreted as 
the daily stock price reaction to a dollar of trading volume (Amihud, 2002; Espinosa, Tapia and 
Trombetta, 2005; Tang and Wang, 2011). When a particular stock has a high ILLIQ value, it 
indicates that the price fluctuates greatly in reponse to trading volume and, therefore, the 
security is considered illiquid (Espinosa, Tapia and Trombetta, 2005). The ILLIQ captures the 
depth and resilience of stocks, by dividing the absolute value of the stock return by the dollar 
value of the trading volume. This gives an estimate of the magnitude of the stock price 





The mandatory adoption of XBRL (ADOPXBRL) is a dummy variable. It takes the 
value of 0 if the period is before the mandatory adoption of XBRL, and 1 if the period is after 
the mandatory adoption of XBRL. 
Control variables 
This study uses some control variables that may affect the firm’s stock liquidity. We 
include firm size (SIZE), which is the natural logarithm of total assets ( Liu, X. (Robert) Luo, 
et al., 2014; Shiri, Salehi and Radbon, 2016; Nagata and Nguyen, 2017). Prior research shows 
that there is a positive correlation between a firm’s extent of disclosure and its size (Jaworska 
and Matusiewicz, 2015) and there is a positive association between SIZE and firm’s stock 
liquidity (Tang and Wang, 2011; Iskandrani, 2016). Therefore, we expect a positive correlation 
between SIZE and liquidity.  
 The variable leverage is also included. Several studies find a significant relationship 
between leverage (LEV) and corporate liquidity (e.g. Bai, Sakaue and Takeda, 2014; Al-Jaifi, 
Al-rassas and AL-Qadasi, 2017). It is defined as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets at 
the end of the year (Tang and Wang, 2011; Rodrigues and Galdi, 2017). Previous studies that 
examine the link between stock liquidity and capital structure find that firms with lower stock 
liquidity tend to be more leveraged (Lipson and Mortal, 2009; Udomsirikul, Jumreornvong and 
Jiraporn, 2011). A negative correlation is expected between LEV and liquidity. 
Then, the variable trading volume (VOLU), we measured it by the annual average of 
daily trading volume (Ascioglu et al., 2012; Frino et al., 2013; Ghorbel and Omri, 2013; Shiri, 
Salehi and Radbon, 2016; Ajina and Habib, 2017). We anticipate a negative relationship 
between trading volumes and the Amihud's illiquidity ratio. 
The price (PRIC), return volatility (RVOL), asset tangibility (TANG), firm age 
(AGE) and Beta (BETA) are also included.  
Price (PRIC): is measured by the average of daily closing prices of each year (Ascioglu 
et al., 2012; Frino et al., 2013; Ajina, Lakhal and Sougné, 2015; Iskandrani, 2016; Shiri, Salehi 
and Radbon, 2016). We expect a negative relationship between share price and the Amihud’s 
illiquidity ratio. Stocks with low prices tend to be more risky (Gajewski and Li, 2015). For 
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example, in France, Ajina and Habib (2017) find that stock price significantly improves the 
liquidity. 
Return volatility (RVOL) is measured by the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
(Roulstone, 2003; Iskandrani, 2016; Ajina and Habib, 2017; Al-Jaifi, 2017; Al-Jaifi, Al-rassas 
and AL-Qadasi, 2017; Gajewski and Li, 2015). This variable reflects information uncertainty 
or risk in the capital market (Yoon, Zo and Ciganek, 2011; Loukil and Yousfi, 2012; Iskandrani, 
2016; Gajewski and Li, 2015). Most studies show that high volatility stocks are riskier and 
consequently less liquid (Dumontier and Maghraoui, 2006; Ben Saada et al., 2010; Ajina, 
Lakhal and Sougné, 2015; Al-Jaifi, 2017). We expect the relationship between liquidity and 
volatility to be negative. 
Asset tangibility (TANG), is the net property, plant, and equipment divided by total 
assets (Prommin, Jumreornvong and Jiraporn, 2014; Al-Jaifi, Al-rassas and AL-Qadasi, 2017). 
Tangible asset payoffs are easier to observe, which leads to a weak information asymmetry (Al-
Jaifi, 2017; Al-Jaifi, Al-rassas and AL-Qadasi, 2017). Therefore, we expect a positive 
association between asset tangibility and liquidity. 
Firm age (AGE) corresponds to the number of years since the company is listed 
(Almutairi, Dunn and Skantz, 2009; Prommin, Jumreornvong and Jiraporn, 2014). According 
to Claessens et al. (2002), older firms have better disclosure, more liquid trading, more attention 
from analysts, and more diversified activities leading to lower risk of financial distress. Kaya 
(2014) states that older firms have more experience with financial reporting and improve their 
financial reporting practices over time. On the other hand, younger and smaller firms may have 
more growth opportunities. Ouimet and Zarutskie (2014) find that young companies employ 
more young workers and exhibit higher growth. Therefore, we estimate a significant association 
between firm age and liquidity. 
Beta (BETA) is included to control for systematic risk (Petersen and Plenborg, 2006; 
Haddad, AlShattarat and Nobanee, 2009; Barus and Siregar, 2014). According to Barus and 
Siregar (2014), higher beta indicates higher risk, which will increase investors’ required return, 
consequently, increase cost of equity. Hence, it is expected to be positively associated with the 
the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio. 
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In addition to firm-specific variables, we use country-level variables that may affect 
liquidity. We use market development (DEV)1 measured by market capitalization divided by 
real country GDP (Gupta, Krishnamurti and Tourani-rad, 2018; Archambault and Archambault, 
2003). We include also inflation (INFL) (Zhu, 2014; ElBannan, 2017). We use the annual 
change in inflation. Finally, we include the variable law enforcement (LENF). This variable is 
measured by the mean score (index)2 across the assessment of regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption (Ben Othman and Zeghal, 2008; Zhu, 2014).  
The year effect, industry effect and country effect are included as dummy variables to 
capture possible variations.  
Insert Table 2 here 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Descriptive statistic 
The descriptive statistics for the total sample in Table 3 (Panel A) reveal that the average 
of the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio is 3.504 before the mandatory adoption of XBRL and 4.248 
after the mandatory adoption of XBRL. It varies widely among the 980 firms with a minimum 
of 0.00001and a maximum of 93.262. 
The variables are compared between the pre-mandatory adoption and the post-
mandatory adoption periods of XBRL using the Mann–Whitney test. In general, this test is used 
to compare the average rank of a given variable in two groups of observations (Kolsi and Zehri, 
2013). It examines the statistical significance level of difference between two average ranks. 
We applied the Mann-Whitney test because our variables are non-normal. We used the Shapiro-
Wilk test to check the normality. The results of the Mann-whitney test show a significant 
difference for all the variables. 
For the independant variable, the mandatory adoption of XBRL (Table 3, Panel B), 
49.72 percent represents firm-year observations where XBRL is mandatory for listed 
                                                            
1 For this variable, we find a lot of missing values, therefore, we use the linear interpolation method to estimate 
the missing values. 
2 We used the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to group the variables regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption into a single variable which is the law enforcement. The law enforcement is calculated as the 
mean score of three mentioned variables because we observed high correlations between these variables. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) is 0.7846 > 0.5 (A limit that indicates that the data is adequate to use the PCA). 
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companies. In contrast, 50.28 percent represents firm-year observations where XBRL is not 
mandatory and is not adopted. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics by country of the dependents and control 
variables used in the empirical analysis. From Table 4, we find controversial results of our 
variables. For example for our dependant variable, we find that ILLIQ, decreased after the 
mandatory adoption of XBRL for some countries and increased for some other countries. For 
example, for United-States, we find that ILLIQ decrease. The mean of the ILLIQ for the post-
adoption period (3.305) is lower than that for the pre-adoption period (3.835), which confirms 
our hypothesis H1. In contrast, for Singapour and United Arab Emirates for example, we see 
that the ILLIQ increase after the mandatory adoption of XBRL, which is in conflict with 
hypothesis H1. 
Insert Table 4 here 
4.2. Correlation analysis 
The correlation of variables is presented in Table 5. Pearson correlation coefficients 
among independant variables are all below 0.6. Therefore, we do not observe any high 
correlations that may affect our regression results. In addition, the values of the variable 
inflation factor (VIF) and the tolerance values indicate the absence of a serious problem of 
multicollinearity (Table 6). As a rule of thumb, there is a problem of multicollinearity between 
a model’s independent variables when VIF values exceed 5 and the tolerance values are lower 
than 0.1 (Groebner et al., 2008).   
Insert Table 5 here 
Insert Table 6 here 
4.3. Regression analysis 
In this study, we eliminated the fixed effects model because our model contains time 
invariable variables which are the dichotomous variables: the industry effect and the country 
effect and the variable Beta. The objective of controlling the dichotomous variables is to 
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eliminate any possible effect that could bias the result.We winsorized also all continuous 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentile to moderate the possible effects of extreme outliers. 
Then to check whether or not there are individual effects, we carried out the “Breusch-
Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier” test. The ‘’Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier’’ test helps us 
to choose between a random effects regression and ordinary least squares regression. The null 
hypothesis of this test is that the variances across entities are zero. There is no significant 
difference across units (the absence of individual effect). The result of this test shows a 
significant chi-square (Prob> Chi2 = 0.000). This allows us to confirm the existence of 
individual effects and thus to retain the random effects model. In addition, according to Baltagi 
(2005) and Ascioglu et al. (2012), the random effects model is the appropriate specification if 
companies are randomly selected from a larger population. 
Then, the heteroskedasticity of our model was tested using the Breusch-Pagan test under 
the null hypothesis that the variance of residuals is homogenous. The test returns a χ2 statistic 
of 46776.91 and a Prob. > χ2 = 0.000. The Breusch–Pagan heteroscedasticity test is significant 
for our model indicating the presence of a heteroscedasticity problem. In addition to 
heteroskedasticity, we test for the presence of serial correlation. This test verifies the hypothesis 
that, the error terms are uncorrelated. Since the observations have a panel structure, we use the 
Wooldridge autocorrelation test for panel data. For our model, the test is significant at the 1% 
level indicating the presence of a problem of autocorrelation (Prob> F is less than 0.05). 
Therefore, to make the necessary corrections and as we are in case of short panel data, we use 
the random effects regression with the "cluster" option. 
The results for our fist hypothesis (H1) reported in Table 7 show that the coefficient of 
the mandatory adoption of XBRL is negative and is significantly related to the Amihud’s 
illiquidity proxy (ILLIQ) at the 5% level. Therefore, we confirm that the mandatory adoption 
of XBRL improves the firm’s stock liquidity, which supports hypothesis H1. This finding is 
consistent with the view that an increase of the information quality and transparency reduce 
information asymmetry and increase firm’s stock liquidity (Botosan, 1997; Haddad, AlShattarat 
and Nobanee, 2009; Ascioglu et al., 2012; Prommin, Jumreornvong and Jiraporn, 2014). 
Investors react positively to the quality of the disclosed information (Ajina and Habib, 2017). 
Our result shows the benefits from the adoption of XBRL and confirms the studies that show 
that investors benefit from its using (Blankespoor, 2019; Tzu-Yi et al., 2016; Yoon, Zo and 
Ciganek, 2011; Peng and Shon, 2011; Bai, Sakaue and Takeda, 2014; Felo, Kim and Lim, 2018; 
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Hao, Zhang and Fang, 2014; Hodge, Kennedy and Maines, 2004; Kim, Lim and No, 2012; Birt, 
Muthusamy and Bir, 2017; Ra and Lee, 2018). For example, according to Peng and Shon 
(2011), as XBRL provides investors with greater accessibility to more precise information in a 
timely manner, investors can better scrutinize reported information for accounting 
irregularities.  
For the firm-level variables, the coefficient for firm size is significant at the level of 1% 
and negative. This result indicates that larger firms exhibit higher stock liquidity. The 
coefficient indicates that 1 point increase on the firm size will lead to an estimated 0.662 
decrease in the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio. This result is consistent with previous studies (Bai, 
Sakaue and Takeda, 2014; Liu, Luo, et al., 2014; Prommin, Jumreornvong and Jiraporn, 2014; 
Al-Jaifi, 2017). For the variable trading volume, it is significant at 1% and negative. Ajina, 
Lakhal and Sougné (2015) find also the same result in France. Hence, we can conclude that 
when the intention of selling and buying tends to increase, firm’s stock liquidity increase. For 
the return volatility, it is negative and significant at 5% level. The cofficients of return volatility 
indicates that 5% increase in the volatility of return will lead to an increase of 0.004 of the 
illiquidity. The cofficients is small but also significant. This result is consistent with Prommin, 
Jumreornvong and Jiraporn (2014), Hakim and Omri (2010), Ajina, Lakhal and Sougné (2015) 
and inconsistent with Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Whalen (2007), Ben Saada et al. (2010). Firm 
age is significant at 1% and positive which is in line with the result of Prommin, Jumreornvong 
and Jiraporn (2014). Therefore, when the firm becomes older, its liquidity becomes less. The 
coefficient indicates that 1 point increase of age, significantly increase the illiquidity by 0.250 
point. The variable beta is negative and significant at the 0.01 level. Hence, firms with high 
betas experience a lower Amihud’s illiquidity ratio, which is contrary to our expectations.  
For the country-level variables, we find a positive and significant relationship at 5% 
between the law enforcement and the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio. Previsous literature confirms 
usually that better law enforcement has a positive effect and improves firm’s stock liquidity. 
Our result contradicts previous studies (Persakis and Iatridis, 2017; Gomez, 2016; Shi et al., 
2015). 
Insert Table 7 here 
In our second hyothesis (H2), we examine whether the effect of the mandatory adoption 
of XBRL is more significant for firms listed in civil law countries than in common law 
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countries. The results presented in table 8 indicate that the effect of the mandatory use of XBRL 
is significant for both common law and civil law countries. However, the effect is more 
prononced for civil law countries. We find a negative and significant at the level of 5% 
association between the mandatory adoption of XBRL in civil law countries and the Amihud’s 
illiquidity ratio. In contrast, we find that the effect of XBRL in common law countries is 
slightly. We find negative and significant association at 10% level between the mandatory use 
of XBRL and the Amihud’s illiquidity measure. Therefore, our second hypothesis (H2) is 
accepted. Usually, civil law countries are characterized by low level of disclosure and low 
investor protection compared to common law countries (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, et al., 
1997; Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Brockman and Chung, 2003; Chung, 2006; Ben 
Othman and Zeghal, 2008; Haidar, 2009; Gruszczyński, 2010). Therefore, the adoption of 
XBRL is a way to reassure investors about the quality of information. A lot of studies indicate 
that XBRL improves the quality of firm disclosures (Efendi, Park and Subramaniam, 2010; 
Peng, Shon and Tan, 2011; Birt, Muthusamy and Bir, 2017; Ra and Lee, 2018). According to 
Ra and Lee (2018), firms suffering from high information asymmetry are more likely to 
experience a greater benefit when the XBRL system is introduced. A decrease in information 
asymmetry and an improvement in the quality of information improve firm’s stock liquidity 
(Ascioglu et al., 2012; Ajina and Habib, 2017; Al-Jaifi, 2017). According to Kim, Lim and No 
(2012), XBRL is more effective communication tools, which enables firms to improve their 
relations with investor by providing more transparent and user-friendly information. Therefore, 
we can state that the adoption of XBRL benefits more the firms listed in civil law countries than 
firms in common law countries. 
For control variables, we find that size, trading volume, return volatility, age, beta and 
law enforcement affect significantly firm’s stock liquidity in common law countries. For civil 
law countries, firm liquidity is affected significantly by age and beta. 
Insert table 8 here 
Additional Analysis 
According to ElBannan (2017), emerging countries have different characteristics from 
developed countries. Emerging countries have less developed capital markets and financial 
institutions, high information asymmetry, and less sophisticated financial markets dominated 
by banks as main sources of financing. For this, the impact of the mandatory adoption of XBRL 
on firm’s stock liquidity may differ from developed and developing countries. 
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Therefore, we separate our sample into developed and developing countries and we 
examine the effect of the mandatory use of XBRL on stock liquidity. Table 9 displays the 
results. The mandatory adoption of XBRL affects negatively and significantly at the 1% level 
the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio in developed countries. In contrast, we find no significant 
relationship between the mandatory adoption of XBRL and the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio in 
developing countries. Therefore, XBRL mandatory adoption improves firm’s stock liquidity in 
developed countries. The implementation of XBRL does not add value to developing countries 
and investors are still viewing developed countries are more transparent. The adoption of XBRL 
does not mitigate existing problems in developing countries. Developing countries often face 
problems. For example, underdeveloped and illiquid stock markets, economic uncertainties and 
frequent government intervention (Tsamenyi, Enninful-adu and Onumah, 2007).  
Insert table 9 here 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the relationship between the mandatory adoption of XBRL and 
the firm’s stock liquidity using a sample of 980 firms across 13 countries. We find that the 
mandatory adoption of XBRL improves firm’s liquidity. Whence, we can confirm the 
advantage of using XBRL. According to Kim, Lim and No (2012), XBRL as a standardized 
business reporting format is an essentiel tool for market participants due to its ability to improve 
accessibility and transparency. In addition, we find that the positive effect of XBRL on firm’s 
stock liquidity is significant for civil and common law countries but it is more pronounced in 
civil law countries. 
Our results are potentially important for countries that have not yet mandated the 
adoption of XBRL, for companies, investors, researchers and professionals. Our findings could 
encourage countries to adopt or to mandate XBRL. Our study could improve users' knowledge 
on the benefits of XBRL. Our result could help also companies to find a way to improve investor 
confidence, and then, improve stock liquidity and reduce the cost of capital. 
This paper is subject to the following limitations. This study uses a relatively small 
sample size of companies. Future studies can repeat our work using a larger sample. In addition, 
this study does not consider all the aspects of liquidity and uses only one measure of liquidity. 
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Table 2 : Variables definition 
Variable Definition  Source 
ILLIQ The Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio Datastream 
ADOPXBRL The mandatory adoption of XBRL takes the value of 0 if 
the period is before the mandatory adoption of XBRL, 
and 1 if the period is after the mandatory adoption of 
XBRL 
Please refer to Table 1 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets Worldscope 
LEV Leverage is the ratio of total debt divided by total assets Worldscope 
VOLU Trading volume is measured by the annual average of 




 Legal system    Source The date of the 
obligation of XBRL 
        Source 
India common law   Factbook  
 
From 2011 www.mca.gov.in/XBRL  
www.xbrl.org  
United-States common law   Factbook  
 
From 2009 www.xbrl.org  
 
Singapore common law   Factbook  
 
2007 O‘Kelly (2010)  
www.xbrl.org 
 
Israel common law   Factbook  
 
2008 www.xbrl.org  
 
China civil law   Factbook  
 
2004 O‘Kelly (2010) 
www.xbrl.org 
Peng, Shon et Tan (2011) 
Chile civil law   Factbook  
 
2010 O‘Kelly (2010)  
www.xbrl.org  
South Korea civil law   Factbook  
 
2007 O‘Kelly (2010)  
Yoon, Zo et Ciganek 
(2011)  
www.xbrl.org  
Japan civil law   Factbook  
 
2007 Bai, Sakaue et Takeda 
(2014)  
O‘Kelly (2010)  
www.xbrl.org  
Spain civil law   Factbook  
 
2005 O‘Kelly (2010)  
www.xbrl.org  
Belgium civil law   Factbook  
 
2007 Liu, Luo et Wang (2017)  
www.xbrl.org  
United Arab Emirates civil law   Factbook  
 
2014 www.xbrl.org 
Saudi Arabia civil law   Factbook  
 
2015 www.xbrl.org 
Denmark civil law   Factbook  
 




PRIC Price is measured by the average of daily closing prices 
of each year 
Datastream 
RVOL Return volatility is measured by the standard deviation 
of daily stock returns 
Datastream 
TANG Asset tangibility measured by the net property, plant, 
and equipment divided by total assets 
Worldscope 
AGE Number of years a firm has been listed Datastream 
BETA Beta estimated via the market model Thomson one 
DEV Market development measured by market capitalization 
divided by real country GDP 
WorldBank 
INFL Inflation measured by the annual change in inflation WorldBank 
LENF Law enforcement measured by the mean score (index) 
across the assessment of regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption 
WorldBank 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the total sample 
Panel A: distributional statistics of dependent and control variables 
Before the mandatory adoption of XBRL 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
ILLIQ 3.504*** 11.472 0.00001 93.262 
SIZE 12.816*** 1.939 8.714 17.997 
LEV 0.258* 0.197 0 0.865 
VOLU 1341.649*** 4261.121 0.190 47057.26 
PRIC 15.602*** 32.697 0.020 259.837 
RVOL 58.789*** 208.694 0.004 1766.824 
TANG 0.366*** 0.233 0.002 0.897 
AGE 11.861*** 8.124 1 42 
BETA       0.947** 0.579 -0.31 2.79 
DEV 90.080*** 41.785 19.627 258.551 
INFL 2.667*** 2.384 -1.120 10.907 
LENF  0.025*** 1.695 -3.126 2.426 
After the mandatory adoption of XBRL 
ILLIQ 4.248 13.853 0.00001 93.262 
SIZE 13.272 2.011 8.714 17.997 
LEV 0.255 0.198 0 0.865 
VOLU 3198.955 8311.735 0.190 47057.26 
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PRIC 18.262 35.526 0.020 259.837 
RVOL 80.766 259.541 0.004 1766.824 
TANG 0.324 0.229 0.002 0.897 
AGE 18.264 8.804 1 42 
BETA   0.964 0.575 -0.31 2.79 
DEV 97.816 50.870 19.627 259.271 
INFL 2.313 2.308 -1.120 10.907 
LENF  -0.022 1.701 -3.126 2.408 
Panel B : descriptive statistics of the independant variable : The mandatory adoption of XBRL 





ADOPXBRL 0 8343 50.28  
1 8249 49.72  
Variables definition : 
ILLIQ : The Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio ; ADOPXBRL: The mandatory adoption of XBRL takes the value 
of 0 if the period is before the mandatory adoption of XBRL, and 1 if the period is after the mandatory adoption of 
XBRL; SIZE : The natural logarithm of total assets; LEV: Leverage is the ratio of total debt divided by total assets; 
VOLU: Trading volume is measured by the annual average of daily trading volume ; PRIC : Price is measured by 
the average of daily closing prices of each year ; RVOL: Return volatility is measured by the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns ; TANG : Asset tangibility measured by the net property, plant, and equipment divided by total 
assets ; AGE : Number of years a firm has been listed; BETA: Beta estimated via the market model; INFL : Inflation 
measured by the annual change in inflation; LENF : Law enforcement measured by the mean score (index) across 
the assessment of regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption 
 
*,** and*** indicate difference significant at 10% level, 5% level and 1% level as per Mann–Whitney test. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics by country 
 
                                                            
3 We included Taiwan just in the descriptive statistics by country due to the unavailability of data for county-level variables 




































ILLIQ 3.835 0.536 3.483 18.294 2.076 0.025 8.398 5.021 0.00827 0.161 0.120 6.285 2.638 0.044 
SIZE 13.406 12.871 13.433 12.976 12.155 13.005 11.923 12.086 12.595 12.274 11.827 12.426 13.292 13.401 
LEV 0.262 0.241 0.260 0.271 0.247 0.252 0.272 0.297 0.253 0.245 0.260 0.326 0.171 0.210 
VOLU 1152.577 2261.841 2303.491   167.025 288.799 244.084 1681.233 1250.77
6 
473.010 5144.386 1913.832 79.417 3618.531 2367.702 
PRIC 26.092 9.224 14.658 31.537 27.255 14.047 2.932 1.948 17.873 0.720 0.777 29.452 1.405 13.124 
RVOL 176.2356 0.689 45.517 175.182 53.171 0.242 22.843 9.346 0.083 7.808 0.926 25.821 6.911 10.972 
TANG 0.328 0.499 0.355 0.303 0.322 0.354 0.338 0.426 0.377 0.340 0.425  0 .320 0.326 0.479 
AGE 13.849 13.041 9.449 13.775 15.982 14.548 11.434 11.605 9.520 6.345 6.866   9.513 4.840 5.501 
BETA  1.065 0.729 0.841   0.600  0.743  0.759  0.926 1.132 1.086 1.200 0.828   0.690 0.559 1.031 
DEV 125.270 101.414 78.594 70.704 68.698 75.217 171.232 67.110 54.623 42.896   71.901 74.736 91.277 
INFL 2.894 3.368 3.233 2.131 2.176 -0.322 0.789 6.026 3.027 0.365    1.518 2.664 2.713 
LENF 1.401 0.962 0.805 0.839 2.355 0.469 1.981 -2.542 -0.517 -3.022 -1.014   0.015 -0.609 -2.073 













































ILLIQ 3.305 1.322 4.484 14.112 2.777 0.038 14.600 6.106 0.006 0.092 0.112 9.795 3.853 0.027 
SIZE 13.941 13.664 14.104 13.494 12.288 13.306 12.495 12.437 12.860 13.350 12.368 12.504 13.810 13.757 
LEV 0.270 0.237 0.322 0.253 0.221  0 .208 0.207 0.286 0.238 0.257 0.244 0.309 0.207 0.248 
VOLU 1466.033 2162.35 2586.563 159.270 201.296 369.1461 2603.983   1142.161 406.524 14608.23 1528.205 204.985 3116.448 1258.52 
PRIC 29.082 12.321 17.066 44.764 31.954 17.054 2.222 3.487 28.093 1.110 1.197 29.024 1.945 10.961 
RVOL 232.892 1.561 91.806 242.827 72.957 0.270 56.093 10.697 0.173 18.660 1.327 43.892 7.633 8.728 
TANG 0.325 0.414   0.322 0.286 0.282 0.349  0 .236 0.397 0.325 0.324 0.348 0.260 0.363 0.507 
AGE 21.012 20.673 16.699 19.337 23.095 22.286 18.438 19.205 16.261 13.531 13.460 14.78 10.28 10.659 
BETA 1.065 0.729  0.841 0.600 0.743  0.759  0.926 1.136 1.086 1.200   0.828 0.690 0.559 1.031 
DEV 126.598 104.076 80.434 64.141 104.561 76.973 226.696 67.157 87.675 54.814  71.481 57.317 66.974 
INFL 1.372 3.200 1.787 1.880 0.890 0.333 2.430 7.702 2.337 2.814  1.851 2.677 1.638 
LENF   1.067 0.986 0.206 0.992 2.246 0.877 2.124 -2.752 -0.255 -2.967  1.304 0.181 -0.016 -1.799 
Please refer to Table 3 for the definition of the variables 
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SIZE LEV VOLU PRIC RVOL TANG AGE BETA DEV INFL LENF 
ADOPXBRL 1.000 
 
           
SIZE      0.114*** 
 
  1.000           
LEV -0.008 
 
0.198***   1.000          
VOLU 
 
     0.137*** 0.259*** 0.045*** 
 
   1.000         






  1.000        










  1.000       












  1.000      














  1.000     
BETA 
 
0.014* 0.027*** 0.046*** 0.117*** -0.106*** -0.042*** -0.049*** -0.088***  1.000    
















  0.007   1.000   








































Variables definition : 
ADOPXBRL: The mandatory adoption of XBRL takes the value of 0 if the period is before the mandatory adoption of XBRL, and 1 if the period is after the mandatory adoption of XBRL; SIZE : 
The natural logarithm of total assets; LEV: Leverage is the ratio of total debt divided by total assets; VOLU: Trading volume is measured by the annual average of daily trading volume ; PRIC : 
Price is measured by the average of daily closing prices of each year ; RVOL: Return volatility is measured by the standard deviation of daily stock returns ; TANG : Asset tangibility measured 
by the net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets ; AGE: Number of years a firm has been listed ; BETA: Beta estimated via the market model; INFL: Inflation measured by the 
annual change in inflation; LENF: Law enforcement measured by the mean score (index) across the assessment of regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption 
 










 ADOPXBRL     SIZE    LEV   VOLU    PRIC   RVOL   TANG    AGE   BETA    DEV    INFL   LENF Mean VIF 
VIF 1.21 1.36 1.15 1.32 1.14 1.30 1.18 1.46 1.08 1.60 1.37 2.37 1.38 
Tolerance 0.823 0.734 0.868 0.756 0.879 0.767 0.849 0.686 0.927 0.626 0.728 0.421 




Table 7: Regressions based on the total Sample 
Variable ILLIQ 
 Coefficient P-Value 
ADOPXBRL -0.669 0.015** 
SIZE -0.662   0.001*** 
LEV 0.548                0.579 
VOLU -0.00004   0.001*** 
PRIC 0.001                0.685 
RVOL -0.004 0.031** 
TANG -0.621                0.665 
AGE 0.250  0.000*** 
BETA -3.148 0.000*** 
DEV -0.001                0.747 
INFL 0.037                0.584   
LENF 1.309                0.042 ** 
Constant 19.640 
Year-effect Included 
Industry -effect Included 
Country-effect Included 
𝑅2 0.1901 
Wald chi2(64) 300.97 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Variables definition : 
ILLIQ : The Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio ; ADOPXBRL: The mandatory adoption of XBRL takes the 
value of 0 if the period is before the mandatory adoption of XBRL, and 1 if the period is after the mandatory 
adoption of XBRL; SIZE: The natural logarithm of total assets; LEV : Leverage is the ratio of total debt 
divided by total assets; VOLU: Trading volume is measured by the annual average of daily trading volume ; 
PRIC: Price is measured by the average of daily closing prices of each year ; RVOL : Return volatility is 
measured by the standard deviation of daily stock returns ; TANG : Asset tangibility measured by the net 
property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets ; AGE: Number of years a firm has been listed; BETA: 
Beta estimated via the market model; INFL: Inflation measured by the annual change in inflation; LENF: 
Law enforcement measured by the mean score (index) across the assessment of regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and control of corruption 
 






Table 8: Regressions based on separate samples of common law and civil law 
countries 
             
 
               Variable 
Sub-sample of common law 
countries 









                     (0.019) 
SIZE     -1.191*** 
(0.000) 






















AGE     0.252*** 
(0.004) 
     0.264*** 
(0.007) 
BETA   -3.489*** 
(0.000) 














Constant 12.508 21.106 




Industry -effect Included Included 
Country-effect Included Included 
𝑅2 0.2136 0.2357 
Wald chi2(64) 213.76 191.71 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Please to Table 7 for the definition of the variables 
The *, **, and *** significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
 
Table 9: Regressions based on separate samples of developed and developing 
countries 
             
 
               Variable 
Sub-sample of developed 
countries 


















VOLU      -0.0001*** 
(0.007) 




  0.003* 
 (0.066) 























INFL      -0.546*** 
(0.000) 
     0.199*** 
(0.002) 
LENF     3.359*** 
(0.000) 
                     -1.104 
(0.132) 
Constant 16.565 2.012 
Year-effect Included Included 
Industry -effect Included Included 
Country-effect Included Included 
𝑅2                     0.2040 0.1875 
Wald chi2(64)                     213.87 148.90 
Prob > chi2                      0.000 0.000 
Please refer to table 7 for the definition of the variables 
The *, **, and *** significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
